Sediment discharge from erosion, urban run-off, and construction can cause environmental degradation. Governments try to regulate sediment, but the regulatory approach is costly to land owners. In principle, a market-based system could reduce costs, but the associated transaction costs are far too high, as market participants must find trading partners, negotiate, and seek government approval.
Introduction
Excess and contaminated sediments damage the ecology of waterways and estuaries (Ribaudo et al. 1999; Strappazzon et al. 2003; Tang et al. 2005; Westra et al. 2005; Hill et al. 2007; Pappas et al. 2008) . Environmental impacts may include the loss of fish, wildlife populations and habitat. Contaminant-laden sediment threatens the viability of ports, due to the high costs of disposal of the dredged sediments. Many studies have recommended nonmarket instruments to manage sediments, such as voluntary programming initiatives, command and control, and financial incentives to use best management practices (BMPs), but these approaches have been criticized as both inefficient and ineffective.
Tradable instruments are being used for SO x , CO 2 , NO x , fishery quotas, and water rights (Tinbergen 1956; Montgomery 1972; Ribaudo et al. 1999; Colby 2000; Woodward and Kaiser 2002; Stavins 2004; Tietenberg 2006; Shortle and Horan 2008; Garrick et al. 2009 ). Montgomery (1972) presented a static framework of a market for emission and pollution licenses. He defined emissions licenses as the right to discharge from the source and pollution licenses as the right to emit into a receptor point. The main point was that pollution licenses would be more suitable as tradable instruments than emission licenses. Unfortunately, pollution licenses are not suitable with many receptors due to high transaction costs.
Participants would need a separate pollution license for each receptor, so a market would be almost impossible to clear. Additionally, strategic decisions by participants in dealing with separate pollution licenses may enable gaming which would reduce market efficiency. Ermoliev et al. (2000) discussed different trade mechanisms for pollution permit markets.
They noted that a bilateral market may converge only with a few receptors. Thus, a traditional market with many receptors would have problems with convergence and high transaction costs. Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) extended Montgomery's work and proposed a dynamic analysis with a banking system and a fixed planning horizon. The authors faced the difficulties A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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4 the reduced gains from trade due to transaction costs with transferable sediment discharge permits in a bilateral market. The author noticed that the transaction costs increased the total cost of achieving an overall load target. Tisdell (2007) evaluated different instruments to reduce sediment discharge in a catchment.
The author tested cap and trade with simple closed auctions, auctions with first and second prices, and command and control policy. Command and control proved to be least efficient, and strategic gaming decisions were observed with first and second price auctions. A cap and trade system with auctions converged to an efficient outcome, obtaining the minimum cost to reduce emission via tradable credits. In theory, tradable credits should achieve the same costminimizing allocations as controls imposed by optimal Pigovian taxes (Stavins 2004) . McCabe et al. (1989; 1991) demonstrated that an auction cleared with the help of an optimization model allows management of complexities and third-party effects of trades (such as the multiple receptors and sediment transport coefficients in our case) that are not possible with an ordinary auction. This optimization-based auction is called a "smart market". Smart markets are currently in active use in electricity and gas. Hogan et al. (1996) presented a linear model (LP) to obtain spot prices in an electricity market. The market operator calculates the optimum dispatch based on bids from participants. Prices vary spatially over the network, depending on constraints in the power system. McCabe et al. (1989; 1991) designed a computer-assisted market for natural gas, as a sealed bid auction. The wholesale market coordinated trade from pipeline sources to delivery points in a network. Participants would submit locational offers/demands in the auction, and an optimization model would clear the market, maximizing the total surplus of trade, with transport capacities as constraints. The model would calculate allocations and prices for all participants. Gallien and Wein (2005) designed a "smart" market for electronic trade in real time for industrial procurement with capacity constraints.
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5 Murphy et al. (2000; proposed a smart market to allocate surface water on a channelized network. They found that a market cleared with a linear programming model with environmental constraints would encourage participants to obtain "beneficial trades," while reducing coordination problems and transaction costs. Raffensperger et al. (2009) developed a linear program to clear a market for ground water. They set up the market with a hydrogeologic simulation to estimate individual impact coefficients at different specific locations (control points) in the catchment. The impact coefficients were the constraint coefficients in the market-clearing optimization. Additionally, the authors noted that the smart market design would reduce transaction costs since participants need not search for trading partners, relevant information is widely available, and bargaining is simplified. Transaction costs are reduced at the expense of costs associated with initially setting up the market. Some costs which appear to be transaction costs are often already being paid even without trading, such as hydrology modeling, monitoring, and enforcement.
A smart market for impervious cover was proposed by Raffensperger and Cochrane (2010) . They developed a market design for controlling runoff near environmentally sensitive areas. The authors noted that property owners would be encouraged to reduce impervious cover level and that governments would be able to improve the environment standards. In this case, property owners would face some transaction costs associated with selecting a set of options for land uses and management practices, calculating the associated costs and run-off factors, and then determining their bids. The government would also have to enforce the contracts by physically visiting owners' properties. Prabodanie and Raffensperger (2007) and Prabodanie et al. (2010) which land uses and management practices were appropriate to their property, calculate the associated costs and run-off factors, and then determine the associated bids. Again, government agents would have to visit owners' properties to ensure that the owners made the changes they had agreed to do. This is similar to BushTender, the Victorian (Australia) government's program for native vegetation offsets (Plott et al. 2008 ).
This paper proposes a smart market for sediment discharge allowances. The market would encourage participants to manage their sediment discharges via BMPs and controlling technologies. This work is similar to recent work in smart markets for hydrological resources in overall structure and the non-point source nature of the discharge, but the physics, the nature of the rights, and consequently the market operation here are specific to sediment discharge. This paper substantially improves on existing market-based approaches for sediment control and non-point source. Because our market functions as a call market, in which potentially many participants have the opportunity to provide rich bid functions, and because the market is cleared in one action (possibly with preliminary rounds for price determination), we expect that this market will equilibrate quickly to a coordinated near firstbest outcome.
We discuss briefly proportional adjustment of initial allocations when grandfathering schemes are originally in place, as suggested by Raffensperger et al. (2009) and Raffensperger (2011) , for scaling back with "constraint quota"; but also we point out ways for up-scaling.
Scaling can allow auction solutions that are both feasible and revenue neutral. Distributional and fairness effects, and problems with property rights as a result of this scaling are outside the scope of this current paper, but are appropriate future work.
Our market design for sediment discharge has the advantages of using all available hydrological information and accepting community input on the desired environmental standards. This approach explicitly avoids "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968) where the public eventually has higher costs due to environmental degradation and sedimentation, but these costs are not paid by those who create the problems. Our proposed method is computationally efficient and it calculates prices for sediment discharge based on auction bids and environmental standards. Our market design may be viewed as a type of cap and trade system (as with the previously mentioned smart markets for hydrological resources), but the set of caps is much richer than, say, for carbon trading.
The market could conceivably have non-convexities which may raise externalities, so it is important to characterize sediment load and transport coefficient models to identify possible non-convexities issues. While we recognize the potential importance of non-convexities, this paper does not focus on this issue, but rather uses a simpler physical characterization to develop the larger institutional design of the smart market.
Market design
This section describes our smart market design in detail. The first part covers the market operations, included a definition of the commodity traded, an explanation of the role of the market manager, a description of how the market manager calculates participant impacts, the bidding and market clearing processes, and enforcement. The second part gives the market model which clears the market, with an analysis of price relationships.
SmartTDA market operations

What is traded
The market requires a clear specification of what is being traded. We define tradable discharge allowance (TDAs) as a right to discharge one kilogram from a specific location Market participation is compulsory, in the sense that the auction is the only legal means of obtaining the allowances, and the penalties for non-compliance should be charged at the market price at least. A participant may need more or fewer allowances, depending on their land use. Buyers would purchase allowances if they were planning to exceed their current sediment discharge rate due to development or other change in land use. Further, they would choose technologies and BMPs for controlling sediment discharge based on their opportunity costs, including the cost per TDA.
The difference between a participant's initial right and their desired rights will be resolved through the market. Figure 1 illustrates the main components of the smart market for sediment discharge. These components are described in detail in the next paragraphs.
Role of the market manager
Our market design requires a central manager to oversee market operations. This market manager could be an environmental agency. The manager specifies sediment limits in the catchment, accepts bids from market participants, clears the market with the optimization model, update and informs, and monitors and enforces the resulting agreements.
It is important to understand that participants would not trade bilaterally. Rather, all participants buy from and sell to a central market manager simultaneously, through a common pool.
Control points and impact coefficients
The proposed market is an auction to sell or buy TDAs to discharge sediment in ways which impact specific locations in the catchment. We will call these locations "control points". These control points could be the outlets of a catchment, a river mouth, or a channel. The market manager would set limits on the maximum sediment allowed to reach each control point.
In addition to these limits, the manager must determine the sediment impact of each participant's existing and proposed actions. To calculate these limits, the manager can use erosion and sediment transport models, based on participants' land uses. We assume that the sediment simulated by an erosion model for a particular site passes through at least one control point. We recognize that many uncertain and unobservable factors affect estimates of impact coefficients from point and non-point sources, but we leave those considerations outside in this market design; we treat the coefficients from sources as certain in the market formulation.
The transport models provide the impact coefficients, F ik , the change in sediment received at control point k, as a result of a unit increase in discharge by participant i at the participant's location. This coefficient is between 0 and 1, but often can be 1 in sediment load areas close to control points. We assume that sediment transport relationships are linear, although a convex non-linear function could be accommodated by adjusting the constant on the RHS of equation (4) below. In our case study, the catchment is small and we assume variations in the time required for the sediment to reach the control point from various properties are not significant over a given length of storm event.
The For large scale predictions, we used GLEAMS (Knisel et al. 1992) . GLEAMS is a continuous simulation model which uses steady-state equations for defining hydrological processes and soil erosion from non-point sources. The hydrological component uses a modification of the SCS curve number approach and the erosion model components estimates soil erosion based on a continuity mass expression (Foster et al. 1980; Tapia-Vargas et al. 2001 ). In GLEAMS, the catchment area is divided into a matrix of grid cells where non-point source erosion is predicted for each grid cell and is routed through the channel. Sediment yield is then predicted at control points in the catchment channel network. We assume the models would estimate sediment discharge with a reasonable degree of certainty and that participants who participate in the market would accept the model outcomes. Market participants who disagree with the predicted yields could have the option of paying for additional modeling from approved hydrology consultants, or for monitoring their sediment discharge.
Following calculation of the impact coefficients, the market manager has all the required information to clear the market, except for participants' bids.
Bidding
At the beginning of the auction, each participant has some known initial allowances. (Scaling of rights may be necessary to establish this initial position, but the details are discussed later.)
Each participant may want to buy more rights, or sell existing rights. Market participants express their willingness to trade through their bids in a monotone increasing way.
Operation of the auction requires that all buyers and sellers are ready to trade at a given case, the auction schedule will depend heavily on specific conditions in the catchment and preferences of the participants. The combination of an initial allocation, an offer curve and a buy curve defines a demand curve representing the value each participant places on various levels of discharge rights that they could hold. This allows us to formulate the market-clearing auction as a "gross pool", as in many electricity markets. The gross pool ignores initial rights in the model, and uses that data in book-keeping separately. A "net pool" formulation could be developed, in which each participant provided an offer curve, to sell rights, and a separate bid curve, to buy more. But Montgomery (1972) noted that a market equilibrium may be achieved independently of the initial allocation, and independent of re-distributional effects, assuming sufficiently low transaction costs (Coase 1960; Stavins 1995) .
The demand curves are expressed in steps of price and quantity pairs, for the right to discharge incremental quantities of sediments, thus providing a piecewise linear approximation of each participant's value function for discharge. Fundamentally the price and quantity pairs represent the value participants place on various land uses, control technologies and BMPs, and development projects on their properties.
The number of steps in each participant's value function would ideally be arbitrary, as participants should themselves be able to choose the form of their own bids. Some markets standardize these steps. For instance, Victoria gas and New Zealand electricity markets allow up to 10 steps for each participant. The TDA market could allow between 1 and 6 steps; the maximum number is mainly a problem of software design. 1943-5452.0000228 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
To assist participants in bidding, to give them some price discovery, the manager could operate a series of tentative rounds before the final binding auction. We assume participants have sufficient knowledge about their costs for land uses and management practices, but that data and the financial consequences of the auction outcomes are private to the participants. To set prices, the manager does not need to know each participant's true private cost information, but only their bids.
Because our system reduces transaction costs, trading should be more active than without our system. However, trading may still be thin because some transaction costs remain, and because few land owners need construction or land use change. Thin trading is not necessarily a problem as long as targets are satisfied, unless it is so thin that only one side of the market is represented, or the regulator wishes to reduce sediment load targets over time. So the manager may wish to encourage participant participation (Shortle and Horan 2001; Shortle and Horan 2008) . Raffensperger and Cochrane (2010) noted that the implementation of a renewal system would incentivise participation. The manager could annul some or all rights at regular intervals, and require land owners to re-purchase the allowances. Sellers or buyers would need to enter the auction at any change of land use, technology change or major development.
Market clearing with optimization
At the close of bidding, the manager uses Model SmartTDA (below) to clear the market and to determine prices and allocations for each participant. Model SmartTDA calculates quantities and prices traded between different participants. The quantities come from the primal solution.
Prices come from the dual solution to the model, and depend on the environmental impact (to the extent that these impacts are modeled as sediment loads), the participants' reservation prices represented by bids/offers (demand) and the environmental caps as constraints.
The auction balances net buyer demand against the constraint limits. With the optimization model, a market for tradable emission or discharge can work with multiple receptors and many trades are not necessary. There may be no decomposition in terms of a sequence of bilateral trades in which parties wishing to increase discharge seek only to buy discharge permits, and parties willing to reduce discharge seek only to sell discharge permits. (There will be a solution if some party is prepared to act as market maker, simultaneously buying and selling permits while managing any imbalance with respect to constraint capacities. But that effectively makes that party responsible for finding and implementing the pool solution developed in this paper). The smart market significantly reduces transaction costs, combining the search for trading partners, price discovery, contracting, and regulatory approval all into one action.
Following solution of the model, the market manager immediately announces the final allocations and prices. The manager records the participants' new TDAs based on their initial allocations and their trades.
Enforcement
Auction rules would require that all participants abide by land uses and management practices for which their bids were accepted. Following market clearing, therefore, the market manager (or some other party) must enforce the agreed behaviors of the contract holders. Ideally, the auction manager would enforce the actual discharges and impacts. However, these discharges are uncertain, and the auction manager's selected discharge model may be incorrect. Hence, the auction is fundamentally about participants' land use and management practices. The auction manager can also monitor actual discharges and impacts. If the monitored sediment discharge proves to be less than the ARC CLM or GLEAMS model predictions, the auction manager could give the participant a discharge allowance which they could either use or sell.
The market system would reflect the costs of meeting environmental limits back onto the parties' activities putting pressure on those limits. From the market, prices will be calculated Laffont and Tirole (1996a; 1996b) , Kwerel (1977) and Montero (2008) . The goal of such a market would be to enable society to satisfy a range of desired environmental outcomes at minimum cost.)
Model SmartTDA
We next describe the market clearing model algebraically, with an analysis of the prices. The model is a gross pool model, in which all participants bid their full demand curve as though they were only buying. After solution of the model, net trades are calculated based on users'
initial allowances. Users face marginal cost prices (rather than price as bid), based on dual variables from the model. Given the impact coefficients F ik from the numerical model, and the participants' submitted bids, the market manager can create the following market-clearing optimization model.
Parameters
C i = Initial discharge rights for participant i (kg).
D ib = Maximum amount that participant i is willing to end up holding in step b of its demand curve, at price P ib (kg).
F ik = Impact coefficient, which is the marginal change in sediment discharged by participant i received at control point k. (kg in control point vs. kg discharged). This is the maximum that participant is willing to pay for one more kg of sediment discharged ($/kg), at that level, and also the minimum for which they would be prepared to discharge one less.
S k = Maximum allowable sediment received at control point k (kg), from these discharges (ie. net of any other sediment load). . We recognize participants could try to bid strategically; but that issue is beyond the scope of our paper.
Decision variables
2. Participant i will sell (buy) discharge rights up to their specified demand curve step, at the specified price. The shadow prices on this constraint are ib and γ ib , which play an important role in the pricing discussion below.
3. The total discharge by participant i equals the sum of discharge bid steps (kg). The shadow price p i on this constraint represents the price to be paid or received by participant i for incremental discharge rights.
4. Total sediments are limited at each control point k. The shadow price k on this constraint is the price, representing the marginal gain to the economy from trade if the environmental constraint limit could be relaxed by one unit.
5. Buy and sell quantities must be non-negative, as must the offer/bid block variables. This non-negativity will limit the final allocation of rights, g i . Imposing additional limits on g i would over-constrain the problem, creating degeneracy (where a constraint is binding, but has a price of 0) for redundant constraints which could compromise prices (Gal 1986 ).
The shadow price p i indicates the increase in total value to the rest of the system, if we give participant i another kg allowance; p i will be non-positive at the optimum, meaning that total value will be reduced if we give participant i another kg. This is the price that the market manager should charge participant i for the right to discharge an additional unit (kg) of sediment from their property. As one might expect, analysis of the dual LP problem reveals that this price is determined by the impact such discharge is expected to have on the sediment received at control points k=1,...,K, where sediment levels are binding. Because no other constraints are modelled in the sediment transport system, this discharge price may be expressed in the following simple form:
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The discharge permits are valued at price p i , which reflects the costs imposed by the impact that discharge has on each control point. Effectively this means that each "discharge right" can be re-expressed as an equivalent bundle of "constraint rights", each constraint valued at its own shadow price k . In general, this price will not match the demand price offered by of participant i, on any step of their discharge demand curve. From the dual, the lower bound of q ib in (2) . Equation (7) implies that i i b p P , the offer/bid price offered for that demand curve step. Only a few marginal offer/bid steps will be in each market clearing solution, typically one for each binding control point limit, but they will set prices throughout the system. All other offer steps will be either "infra-marginal" or "supra-marginal".
Supra-marginal steps are those for which the demand price ib P exceeds the market clearing price i p at that location. All such steps will be cleared by the auction, because they each represent a use whose value exceeds the costs imposed on the rest of the system. This means they will have q ib = D ib , and by complementary slackness 0 ib . But the lower step limit can and i p , in accordance with equation (7).
After clearing the model, the trades are adjusted for the initial allocation by a referential constraint as follows:
Because qbuy i and qsell i are unconstrained, they will not affect the solution, or prices. They are used only to determine buy/sell quantities and could be omitted from the LP clearing formulation.
In the market auction settlement, each participant i should be charged (or paid, if the value is negative) p i (qbuy i qsell i ). These clearing prices indicate the economic costs for increasing sediment discharge by potential auction participants, and are useful for planning and policy purposes. In fact, the same prices would be produced by an optimisation model run by a central planner, using the same end-use value curves, to choose least-cost policies.
Managing over-allocation and under-allocation
If the catchment is over-allocated, the manager must have previously granted rights above the rights for a product that cannot be delivered, we would expect them to be liable to at least refund the purchase price, if not compensate the purchasers for any losses that may arise. One way of doing this would be for the market manager to be a participant, purchasing TDAs so as to bring the allocated rights down to the catchment's limits. Re-purchase prices may be very high, because participants, having already invested on the basis of allocated rights, will see high economic costs in downsizing. But these prices are appropriate because they represent real costs to society. Requiring the manager to manage constraints in this way incentivizes the manager to exercise appropriate care in allocating rights.
However, the normal rules of economics and commercial law may not apply to regulatory authorities, and the market manager may wish to adjust allocations while also maintaining revenue neutrality. If limits are scaled down, participant rights must also be adjusted downward somehow, and Raffensperger (2011) discusses a number of options to achieve revenue "sufficiency". A simple approach would be to make proportional adjustments to all discharge rights, thus multiplying C i by α in equation (8) 0 1 , with α set so as not to overload the most critical control point. But this scaling is unnecessarily severe, if more than one receptor is involved, and nor does it revenue "neutrality". To achieve that goal, we must first decompose discharge rights for participant i into a weighted bundle of notional "constraint impact rights", C ik :
Scaling discharge rights implicitly scales constraint impact rights for each constraint by the same fraction, whether or not it is over-allocated. This is unlikely to be revenue neutral, because the market will generally clear with participants, in aggregate, having to implicitly A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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21 buy back "constraint rights" which they had previously been allocated, but lost through the scaling process, just to maintain their status quo position. But, because equation (8) has no impact on the market solution, and only affects settlements after the market clears, the market manager has considerable flexibility as to how initial rights are treated in the settlement process. One can imagine various schemes that preserve revenue neutrality by re-distributing any profit/loss among participants. But to preserve revenue neutrality within the auction itself, we need to re-set the initial position of each participant by scaling the constraint right components, C ik , for each constraint k (up or down) to match the new constraint limit for k.
That scaling need not be linear, so long as the total matches the new constraint limit. It could, for example, give older rights priority over newer ones, or purchased rights priority over inherited ones. But we will assume that the implicit rights associated with constraint k are all scaled proportionately, by k . If we let
C be the market-clearing discharge for participant i, the net payment required, after scaling initial constraint rights, C ik , would be:
This scaling ensures that all constraint limits are fully allocated at the beginning of the auction. So the amounts implicitly bought by the new owners will match those implicitly sold by the old owners, thus ensuring revenue neutrality. When the auction clears, some of the new constraint limits could be slack, in which case no money changes hands because the price is zero. But all those involved in binding constraints will make or receive some payment.
Participants who decide to continue activities unchanged will need to maintain their discharge rights by making supplementary payments to restore the pre-scaled level of their rights with respect to any constraint for which rights had to be scaled down. But they would receive allowances for implicit rights held with respect to any constraint which had been underallocated (so rights could be scaled up), but now has a positive constraint price because it is Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management. Submitted May 8, 2011; accepted January 5, 2012; posted ahead of print January 7, 2012. doi:10.1061/(ASCE) WR.1943-5452.0000228 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
22 fully allocated. To preserve feasibility, though, some participants must decide to reduce or adapt their activities, and they will receive payments for releasing rights for the tightened constraints, and most likely for other constraints too.
Participants may not think this ideal, but it is the best that can be done, in terms of preserving initial right allocation, while preserving revenue neutrality. They will not like having to pay more to maintain rights they have already bought, but this is inevitable if some rights have to be scaled back, and this proposal at least minimizes that requirement. They may also find the transactions difficult to understand, and hence accept, especially if the F coefficients have a complex structure. That could be the case if, say, the market manager imposed a variety of constraints to deal with the differing pollution impacts of various usage types, at various locations, in the context of a groundwater model, such as that of Raffensperger et al (2009) . In our case, though, the F coefficients have a simple structure.
Sediment from each source will pass down a series of channels to the ultimate sink, and the amount passing one receptor cannot rise, as we move downstream because channel erosion is not simulated. A participant may be affected by the tightening of limits at several control points, but those control points will lie on a path between the participant and the sink, and the participant's proportional interest will be greatest in the closest control points. All participants upstream of each control point where limits are tightened will implicitly have to trade between themselves, and with no-one else, to bring aggregate discharge within the new limit. Thus, for example, the payment required from a participant who opts not to change their activity would be expressed as a list of part-payments for maintaining their position with respect to sediment passing through each tightened control point between them and the sink. Participants who reduce their dispatch may see a mix of debits and allowances, but the structure of the transactions should still be fairly clear, greatly increasing the likelihood of acceptability. 
Market simulations and discussion
Example application: Auckland, New Zealand
We discuss a hypothetical example applying the SmartTDA model using the GLEAMS and ARC CLM models, to a small catchment in Auckland, New Zealand. The relevant local government manager could be the Auckland Regional Council (ARC). We consider two stormwater manager units (SMU) representing a small subcatchment within the Swanson catchment in Auckland. Figure 3 illustrates the subcatchment layouts with the initial land use conditions. The number and size of specific properties within the SMU are assumed for this application, but exact values were not available for our study. We assume that all sediments are discharged to a stream with one control point. Every property is assumed to have one point of discharge and participants have initial rights explicitly. Table 1 summarizes the estimated sediment discharged (initial rights) from both SMUs and the land use. We assume 50%
impervious cover in urban areas, and use ARC CLM to calculate the resulting sediment discharge.
For our demonstration, suppose a few developers within these SMUs wish to discharge an extra amount of 330.130 kg/year (participants 3, 15 and 19). If a discharge for the SMU (catchment) were not regulated, developers would not be pressured to control sediment discharge. However, if an upper limit of sediment discharge is set for a specific control point, the participants would be required to control discharges in the catchment. To control their discharge, participants can choose a best management practice (BMP) or erosion control.
Participants can evaluate the effectiveness of the different BMPs and estimate these differences in sediment controls by using ARC CLM or GLEAMS.
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Participants and trading requirements
To minimize their own costs, the developers want to participate in the auction to buy discharge allowances. They evaluate available technologies to control sediment discharge according to their opportunity cost, determining their minimum (maximum) willingness' to accept (pay).
Participants choose their bids based on the cost of BMPs and technologies to reduce sediment, as well as their profits associated with a given level of sediment discharge. Every participant has three options. We assume costs for each technology, and that the cost of technologies to control sediment discharge is different for each participant. Each participant has different characteristics and requirements.
We develop bids for 20 notional participants, participants 1-16 in the SMU1 subcatchment, and participants 17-20 in the SMU2 subcatchment. Table 2 summarizes these participants as well as their options. To retain initial sediment rights, participants should bid in their first tranche a price high enough to signal their maximum willingness to pay for keeping the initial conditions; otherwise, the market clearing model would view a low offer as the participants' willingness to trade the sediment rights. In this example, we assume prices are high enough in the first tranche for those who want to keep initial conditions and low for those who want to trade a proportion of their total sediment rights. We assume that every participant's discharge has a one-to-one effect on the control point, so F i = 1 for all participants i = 1,…,20. Some participants such as participant 3 (described below) plan construction, and therefore could use the ARC CLM model to plan their bids. Other participants such as participants 3 and 15 (described below) plan land use changes, and could use the GLEAMS model to plan their bids.
We also give an example of urban land owned by the environmental authority, as participant 20.
Participant 1 has 2.35 hectares with native forest to be discharging 603 kg/year. Having evaluated several practices and opportunity costs, this participant wishes to implement a The council wishes to sell the sediment controlled in the market, in three tranches at the minimum prices of $8. 33, $18.75 and $27.78 per kg respectively.
Case 1: neither under nor over-allocation. Total discharge rights equal the limit
In this case, we assume that the manager sets a total discharge limit of 251,692 kg/year. The catchment is neither under-allocated nor over-allocated. Because the catchment is neither under nor over-allocated, we might expect that no trade will occur. However, participants have Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management. Submitted May 8, 2011; accepted January 5, 2012; posted ahead of print January 7, 2012 . doi:10.1061 /(ASCE)WR.1943 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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28 different opportunity costs, so in fact trade will happen. Table 3 
Case 2: under-allocation. Total discharge rights are below limits
In this case, the manager sets an upper limit for the catchment at 300,000 kg/year, which is above the existing total discharge rights. The catchment is now under-allocated. In this case, the clearing price in the market was $4.7 per kg, and the total quantities traded of allowances were 53,480 kg to sellers and 101,788 kg to buyers. The manager would receive a net $227,047, because the manager participates as a net seller of excess discharge allowances (see last column in Table 4 In this case, the manager sets a discharge limit of 150,000 kg/year which is significantly lower than the original discharge limit of 251,692 kg/year presented in Case 1. The manager observes that the current allocation is above the new limit of the catchment. Consequently, before the auction, the manager informs participants that the catchment condition is overallocated. To obtain an allocation that satisfies the control point constraint, the manager can adjust every participant's initial right by down-scaling using an α = 0.59. All participants lose some rights to discharge, without compensation. We note that this may be politically difficult (as mentioned earlier, government could choose to set a higher α, in which case the manager would be a net buyer of discharge allowances). Then the manager runs the model again, determines prices and quantities, and pays or charges each participant. Table 5 summarizes the market outcomes. The clearing price in the market is $14.00 per kg, and total quantities traded were 71,884 kg to sellers and 71,884 kg to buyers. The manager would receive a net income of effectively $0 (or $3 due to rounding errors). All participants traded in this example. However, if initial rights had not been down-scaled, the regulator would end up paying $1,423,688 after clearing the market (see last column in Table 5 ). This column was included in Table 5 
Conclusion
A SmartTDA market to allocate sediment rights efficiently assigns allowances among participants, as the decision may be made more quickly and transparently. Further, the market will allow society to reduce its impact on the catchment at much lower cost, by enabling trade.
Additionally, the market would allow down and up-scaling to keep the regulator revenue neutral.
Participants would face a market-price equilibrium which would incentivise better management to control sediment discharge in the catchment. The use of dual price p i enables the representation of valuated impacts at control points. The dual price k corresponds to the improvement in total welfare or trading value if the regulator gives another unit of receiving sediment at control point k. This value would encourage BMPs which would allow controlling sediment discharge, especially at environmentally sensitive areas.
The market design is based on erosion models which estimate impacts in routed systems.
These may give poor impact estimates in some storm scenarios and catchment. Consequently, the models require substantial validation and testing to ensure the market's reliability.
The proposed market design does not take into account the inter-temporal effects from the sediment movement along control points. Our illustration for the proposed market considered only instantaneous impacts into receptor control points and thus is only suited for a small catchments (388 ha approx). This effect on prices and allocations must be evaluated carefully, because effects beyond the planning horizon may distort clearing prices, allowing for instance, free riding participants. An improved version of this design could incorporate inter-temporal effects in the market.
Other limitations are the rainfall stochasticity, which affects sediment discharges from each property, and stochastic process in sediment transport, which affects impacting coefficients.
These effects should be evaluated by the market manager and could also be incorporated in the market design. Possible problems with dimensionality and non convexity should be studied in this case. We plan to study the risk implications for participants and the market manager, longer term impacts, and prices under stochasticity. Figure 3 Sub-catchment schematic layout of the channel network, properties, and initial land uses for the example applications. Blue and black arrows represent channels and sediment directions respectively, and the black circle corresponds to the control point.
